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rate by varying the intensity of search. The optimal intensity of search will be chosen at the level at which the marginal returns to search are equal to the marginal cost of search.
Burdett and Mortensen (1978) present a search model with endogenous search effort. In their model, an increase in the time spent on search increases the average number of job offers arriving within a given time interval, but also causes a utility loss due to a decrease in leisure time, which gives the cost of search. In Mortensen (1986) a simpler version of the same model is presented. An explicit cost of search function2 is formulated and an increase in search effort raises the job offer arrival rate. Benhabib and Bull (1983) model search intensity somewhat differently. They deviate from the sequential search framework by allowing the individual to choose at the end of the period the job with the maximum wage from the jobs s/he applied for. Thus, expected returns to search arise from the expected increase of the largest wage offer as intensity increases, rather than from an increase in the job offer arrival rate. Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) address the impact of different search channels in the context of an equilibrium search model. The unemployed can get wage offers from the wage offer distribution and wage offers from the distribution of wages earned. The first type of offers is interpreted as job offers obtained through a direct application and the second type is interpreted as job offers obtained through an informal contact by a friend or relative.
With regards to points (i) and (ii):
we allow parameters of the job offer arrival rate and the cost of search function to be different for individuals in a different labour market state. Throughout the paper, we will denote the market efficiency parameter by X1 and the cost of search function by cl(s), 1 = e, u, where the subscript e denotes the state of employment and u the state of unemployment. Differences in the search conditions between labour market states causes the reservation wage ? to be different from b. For the employed the reservation wage is still equal to the current wage.4
Note that a difference in the efficiency parameter k, between labour market states is sufficient to generate different transition rates for different labour market states, even if cost of search were the same. However, differences in the cost of search may arise if the value of unemployment were to include a leisure or an investment component that is heterogenous in the population. With regards to points (iii) and (iv): in the data (see Section III) information on search is selfreported: survey respondents can state to be searching for a job or not. For a fraction of the individuals who report not to be searching, a transition into employment (or into another job) is observed. Measurement or reporting error in the search indicators may be one reason for these observations. The stochastics of the empirical specification that incorporates reporting error are discussed in Section IV. A second reason for observing transitions for nonsearchers may be that individuals are invited to take up a particular job. Personal contacts may play an important role here. Irrespective of the reason, we need to adapt the specification of the job offer arrival rate, since in the original model a search effort of zero implies a zero job offer arrival rate and consequently a zero transition rate. For an individual labelled i who is in the labour market state 1, 1 = e, u, we specify the job offer arrival rate as (ao0 + •ls) kil. The factor Xil is the market-determined part of the arrival rate that depends on the characterics of individual i. More specifically: ~il = exp(K/'zi), in which K, is a parameter vector and zi is a vector of individual specific variables, related to demand side conditions, which, for reasons of identification, does not contain an intercept. al measures the impact of search intensity on the arrival rate. The parameters at0 and •c may be interpreted as 'baseline' parameters related to search intensity, whereas Xil is a factor describing individual specific deviations from this baseline. The parameter ato is identified by the observed transitions of nonsearchers. The parameter vector at is identified by observations on individuals who are searching, and Kc is identified by variation in individual characteristics.5
With regard to point (v): Mortensen's (1986) model is formulated in terms of a one-dimensional variable "search intensity," while the paper does not deal with observability issues related to this variable. The data, described in Section III, contain several indicators of search intensity. A possible way to link the various indicators to the theoretical concept of "search intensity" is to construct a one-dimensional variable for instance by defining a linear combination of the observed indicators. However, the different indicators of search intensity are related to different channels or methods of search, which are potentially different with 4. In this version of the paper we abstain from nonzero cost of turnover.
5. In the remainder of the paper we will drop the subscript i from Xil. respect to their effectiveness and search cost. A typical individual observed to be searching for a job does not necessarily use all of the search channels. Mapping the observed indicators into a one-dimensional variable would result in a loss of information on the use of various search channels. To exploit such information we will model the use of each particular search channel in the same way as Mortensen (1986) models the search decision: it is optimal to use a search channel if the marginal returns to search of the particular channel equals the marginal cost of using it. As a result, in the empirical model search intensity s is a vector of search indicators. Accordingly, in the sequel the search effectiveness parameter al and the marginal cost of search cl'(s), 1 = e, u, represent vectors of equal dimension as s. 6 In the empirical specification, the cost of search function is chosen to be additively separable in search channels for reasons of convenience: S c1(s) =1,cj= cli(s), l= e, u, and S indicates the number of search channels. In general this would preclude complementarity of search channels.7 In the empirical specification common indicators of observed and unobserved heterogeneity will be included in the different terms of the cost of search function so that a close link between the different terms in the cost of search a function is established. Finally, with regard to point (vi), we allow for an exogenous layoff rate T. The considerations above lead to the following model assumptions.
Assumption 1
The job offer arrival rate for labour market state 1, 1 = e, u is ((ax + cals) 1, with alo > 0, ac > 0, X1 > 0. Search effort is indicated by s, s 2 0, and s is allowed to be a vector of which each component represents a search channel.
Assumption 2
The cost of search in the labour market state I is defined by the cost of search function cl(s), which is convex, has the property cl'(s) > 0, and is additively separable in search channels. Assumption 3 A job is characterized by the wage. A wage offer arrives from the wage offer distribution F(.).
Assumption 4
There is an exogenous layoff rate Y.
Assumption 5
The benefit income level for someone unemployed is denoted by b.
Assumption 6
Individuals maximize the expected present values of income net of search costs. The solution of the maximization problem is characterized by the optimal intensity 6. In Section IV, we will specify the cost of search function showing that it is easy to map the underlying optimal search levels of the various search indicators into a one-dimensional variable, which may be interpreted as the latent "search intensity." 7. Van in which alj denotes the search effectivity parameter of search channel j in the labour market state 1, 1 = e, u, and x, = 4, Xe = w for someone employed at wage w. Then the optimal level of search intensity slj* equals max{0, sj }. Thus, optimal search intensity satisfies the marginal cost equals marginal returns to search condition if the outcome is positive. Condition (2) reveals some important properties of the optimal search intensity.10 First, note that by the convexity of the cost of search function (Assumption 2) the marginal cost of search is increasing in search intensity. This implies that if the effectiveness of search, represented by the factor a1l Ai,, rises, the optimal intensity of search by channel j rises as well. Note that this also applies to the decision to search: a low value of the effectiveness of search may induce workers not to search. Second, Conditions 1 and 2 describe the simultaneous movement of the optimal search intensity and the reservation wage. Since condition 1 implies a positive relation between the benefit level and the reservation wage for the unemployed, a higher benefit level reduces the intensity of search according to condition 2. For the employed, the reservation wage is equal to the current wage. Thus, search intensity is lower the higher is the wage. Once someone employed has found a job with a sufficiently high wage, s/he will stop searching. 
Other
Thus, we emphasize that the (un)employment state is self-reported, and that the selection of the (un)employed is made on basis of this self-reported state. We selected male individuals, younger than 65, who report to be employed or unemployed in the wave of October 1987. In addition, in April 1988 and October 1988, employed and unemployed individuals, that had not yet been selected in the previous wave(s), are added. Survey respondents report one of the labour market state out of the states listed above on a month by month basis, for the past six months, and this information is used to construct the duration of spells of employment and unemployment. Note that, depending on the wave of sampling, the observation period for an individual is up to eighteen months. In addition the backward recurrence times of employment and unemployment spells can be determined from the survey information." This is based on the question "How long have you been unemployed?" and "At which month/year did your present job start?" The sample thus obtained is a stock sample, which will be accounted for in the estimation of the model. We only consider single spell employment durations. Given the average job duration (see Table 3 Note that the information on search is self-reported: someone is defined to be a searcher if he answered positively to the first question. Also note that the questionnaire imposes no restrictions between the additional questions for searchers, neither on the routing nor on the outcomes. For example, a respondent who reports to have been applying for a job, does not necessarily report to have been "looking," and a respondent who reports to be searching does not necessarily report a positive number of applications. These features of the phrasing of the questionnaire need to be incorporated in the model specification.
Furthermore, we would like to address the question whether there is a relation between the reported information on search and the eligibility to unemployment benefits. According to the Dutch Unemployment Law (WW) an individual is eligible to unemployment benefits if (i) he is unemployed or his working week schedule has been reduced by five or more hours, (ii) he has been employed for at least 26 weeks of the 39 weeks previous to employment (no matter the length of the working week), (iii) he is available for a "suitable""3 job only. An individual who is not eligible for unemployment benefits may be eligible for social welfare benefits. Note that in the law "availability" for a job is the criterium for unemployment benefits.
At the time of the survey, though, there was not an active government policy in terms of sanctions to someone entitled to benefits who was unwilling to accept a "suitable" job. In 1996, the Law on Penalties and Measures"4 was introduced in which explicit sanctions against the unwilling unemployed are formulated. This suggests that positive response of a survey respondent to the use of search channels is not just a reflexion of benefit entitlement. Also note that the data we use are based on survey information rather than on administrative data from the unemployment registry. Therefore, there is no direct link between "unemployment" according to our definition and benefit entitlement.
In practice, anyone who wants to claim an unemployment or social welfare benefit has to register at the employment office. As shown later on, none of the employed who are looking for a job reports to be registered at the employment 12. "Applying for a job" means writing a letter of application, making a phone call, etc. 13. A "suitable" job usually means a job that matches the education level of the unemployed. 14. Wet Boeten en Maatregelen. office. Although registration at the employment office may have a positive impact on finding a job, it is directly related to entitlement to benefits, and the choice to register at the employment office is likely to be different from the decision to equate marginal returns and marginal cost of search. Moreover, for individuals who do not report to be searching, we do not observe directly whether or not they are registered at the employment office. Therefore, we decided not to use information on registration at the employment office as an indicator of search. Using the survey information we can construct three search indicator variables Sl The indicator s, will be referred to as the "search attitude" indicator: it is one for respondents who report to be "searching seriously." The relation between indicators s2 and ^3 and the survey question is straightforward. In Section IV we provide a link between the observed indicators in Equation 4 and the optimal search intensity introduced in Section II. Note that the indicators sj, j = 1, 2 do provide information on the intensity of search, even though they are binary indicators: the decision to search and search intensity are closely related. Individuals who report to be searching seriously have a higher underlying latent search intensity than individuals who report not to.'6 Information on labour market state and search can be used to distinguish four groups in the sample: employed searching for a job, employed not searching for a job, unemployed searching for a job, and unemployed not searching for a job. Note that the group of unemployed who are not searching follows from to the above definitions of labour market state and self-reported search: someone is registered in the sample as an unemployed who is not searching if he reports to be unemployed, by selecting the state of unemployment out of the seven labour market states listed earlier, and if he answers "no" to the question whether he is searching for a job. Table 1 displays information about the number of observations and transitions in the sample. The percentage of job-to-job transitions is higher among the employed searching for a job than among the employed who are not searching. A similar observation can be made for the unemployed. Figures 1 and 2 present Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor functions for the raw data, without correction for any source of heterogeneity. Neglected heterogeneity will bias downward 15. Thus we obtain the number of applications per time unit. In measuring the number of applications over two months, the fact that individuals with a backward recurrence time of one month report applications per month, rather than over two months, has to be accounted for. We do this by rescaling the number of applications. Note that the procedure of rescaling can be justified if the number of applications in a given time interval are assumed to follow the Poisson distrobution. 16. A comparison with labour supply can be made: indicators for participation and the number of working hours both provide information on labour supply. any estimate of duration dependence. These figures also show the survivor function for the duration data separately for those who are searching and those who are not. The survivor function of unemployment duration in Figure 1 decreases rapidly in the first ten months of unemployment. After ten months, its slope decreases, indicating negative duration dependence, which may be partly attrib- Figure 2 shows the Kaplan-Meier survivor function for employment duration. There is a large difference between the survivor function of the employed who are searching on the job and those who are not. The scale of employment duration is different between the two groups. For the employed who are not searching there is evidence of strong negative duration dependency. Apart from "true" negative duration dependence, this may be explained by the prediction of the search model that once individuals have found a job with a satisfactory wage level, they stop searching for another job and stay employed. Table 2 contains information about the indicators of search. As the indicators of search are only applicable to those individuals who report to be searching for a job, the information in Table 2 relates to this subsample. From the 500 employed who are searching on-the-job, 47.8 percent report to be "searching seriously." The percentage of these who is "looking for work," in the way defined before, is 74.6. Among the group of employed people who are searching 56.5 percent have actually been applying for a job in the past two months. A large part of them (25.6 percent) has been applying for a job only once, whereas 13.4 percent applied twice. Among the subsample of 312 unemployed who are searhing for a job, 81.8 percent report to be "searching seriously." This is obviously a higher percentage than we found for those employed. The remaining search indicators also show that the unemployed search more intensely than the employed: 78.2 percent are "looking for work," whereas 64.1 percent have applied for a job in the past two months. Table 3 provides sample statistics of duration, weekly income, and background characteristics of the employed and the unemployed who are searching and those who are not. The mean of duration is based on both completed and right hand censored spells. The mean of duration for the unemployed who do not search is eight months higher than the mean for the unemployed who are searching for a job. The mean weekly benefit income of the unemployed who are not searching for a job is higher than that of the other unemployed.
There is a considerable difference between the mean wage of the employed who are searching and the mean wage of the employed who do not search. The mean wage of those who are searching is lower than the mean wage of those who do not search. This is in accordance with the theoretical model spelled out in the previous section, which predicts a negative relation between the current wage and the decision to search.
The available background characteristics are age, four education dummies for the level of education, educl, educ2, educ3 and educ4, with educ 1 the lowest level of education (the highest level, educ5, serves as reference group),17 three sectoral dummies, secl, sec2, and sec3, the regional dummies regionl, region2, and region3, and a 17. When estimating the model, for the specification of the job offer arrival rates we will merge the education levels 4 and 5 together to one level, which serves as the reference level. dummy for marital status which is one if married and zero if not. Secl is a dummy for education in the technical sector which includes chemistry, physics, mathematics and biology, sec2 refers to economic and administrative education, sec3 is general education and the fourth sector, which serves as a reference sector and is not included as a dummy, is the service sector. Region] is a dummy for the strongly industrialized western part of the Netherlands, Region2 is the east where we find a mixture of industrial and agricultural activities, Region3 is the south of the Netherlands characterized both by the presence of some large companies and agricultural industry and the fourth region, which is the region of reference for which no dummy variable is included, is the remaining part of the country with a sizeable agricultural sector. Note that the mean age for those who are searching is lower than for those who are not, in either labor market state.
The estimation of the model will also include the estimation of the parameters of the wage offer distribution. For this purpose we will use information on accepted wages for the unemployed who experienced a transition into employment (see Table 3 ), the wages of employed individuals before a transition (Table 3 ) and the accepted wages of the employed individuals after a transition (Table 4 ). In Section IV we construct the likelihood contribution for these different types of observations on wages. Table 3 shows that for 84 of the unemployed individuals with a transition we observed the accepted wage.18 On the average, accepted wages are higher than benefit levels. Table 4 shows information on the accepted wages of the employed for which both the wage before a transition and the wage after a transition is observed. The quar-18. In the SEP, the number of observations on accepted wages is typically lower than the number of observations for which a transition is observed. This can be partly attributed to item nonresponse that is typical for information on income and partly to item and wave nonresponse related to the fact that information on income is collected in the October survey only. 3 suggests an overall increase in the distribution of wages, there are also individuals reporting a lower wage after the transition than before. This is obviously inconsistent with the reservation wage property of the employed, and hence we will include measurement error in observed wages in the next section in order to account for such observations.
IV. Empirical Specification
The behaviour of individuals searching for a job is described by the reservation wage Equation 1 and the optimal search Condition 2. To implement the model empirically we provide a link between the optimal search intensity derived in Section II and the available search indicators in the data. For this purpose we specify in Section IVA a cost of search function and we introduce stochastics into the model. The model will be estimated by (simulated) maximum likelihood and the likelihood contributions are presented in Section IVB.
A. Specification
In order to obtain explicit expressions for the optimal intensity of search along various channels we specify the following cost of search function: This will identify the effect of 4 separately from the effect of the reporting errors introduced later on. 19 We assume that 4 is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 1. In the sequel we will suppress the argument 4 to simplify notation. . There is no closed form solution for this integral.20 There are several solutions to this problem and we discuss two of them, both having their own specific advantages and disadvantages. The first is the introduction of a fixed stopping rule. As an example, we may assume that once someone has become employed he can change jobs only once, so the second job only can be ended by a layoff.21 This rule enables the computation of the expected income gain due to search. However, it will also change the reservation wage: The reservation wage will not be equal to the current wage. Since on-the-job search with a reserva-19. Note that this approach is equivalent to the common practice in the estimation of the wage distribution in search models, in which the variance of the offer distribution is identified separately from the variance of the distribution of measurement error. As we will show later on, for employed individuals the computation of Rej is based on the latent accepted wage, instead of the observed wage, which also will depend on 4'. term Ej1, which may represent reporting error. Equivalently, in Equation 11 SI represents the latent optimal search intensity including a stochastic error. Equation 10 implicitly defines the probability that someone in the labour market state I reports the use of search channel j (Slj = 1).
Note that it is straightforward to make solution in Equation
The stochastic specification for the number of applications is more complicated. The number of applications, Sl3, 1 = e, u, is a variable that can only take discrete values (like 0, 1, 2, and so on). How can we, both conceptually and technically, fit a discrete random variable into a continuous time search framework? Conceptually, we may assume that individuals who search more intensively meet potential job opportunities at a higher rate and when an opportunity is met an application is submitted.
Technically Note that the covariance matrix is not restricted to be diagonal: thus we allow for correlation in reporting error of the different search indicators. By the relation si= s-+ +E, Equation 15 implicitly defines the density function of 31 which we will denote by g (st; 1l), 1 = e, u for future reference. Wage offers arrive from the lognormal density with log-variance t2. Furthermore we assume that accepted wages are observed with a log-normally distributed measurement error with log-variance am2. Finally, the layoff rate a is made dependent on individual characteristics a by specifying a = exp (?' a).
B. Likelihood Contributions
The parameters of the job offer arrival rate, the cost of search function, the wage offer distribution, the layoff rate, and the parameters of the distribution of reporting error in search indicators and measurement error in wages are estimated simultaneously by the method of simulated maximum likelihood. In this section we will show how the likelihood contributions for the model outlined in the previous two sections can be formulated.
To construct the likelihood contribution for an observation (tt, s, wO, wO) consisting of duration t1, search indicator s = ( ,2, s3 )', the observed wage before a transition w0 (employed only) and the observed wage after a transition wO, we first will address the separate parts that are involved: (i) the density function of duration (t1), conditional on the value of the (latent) search intensity s-, 1 = e, u (defined in Equations 10 and 13); (ii) the density function of the latent search intensity s*, 1 = e, u; (iii) the distribution of wages; (iv) the Poisson distribution for the observed number of applications (defined in Equation 14). As we will see, combining the various parts of the likelihood contribution involves (after multiplication) the integration over the latent search intensity as well as integration over the latent (accepted) wages and unobserved heterogeneity.
(i) Denoting transition intensities for transitions from unemployment into employment by Oue (Su) and job to job transitions by 0ee (Se) we have:24 Since transition rates in models of search both depend on the arrival rate and the wage offer probability, separate identification of wage offer parameters from the job offer arrival rates usually is extremely difficult: in datasets the covariates that are likely to affect the wage offer distribution are often the same as the covariates that affect the arrival rate. Information on search indicators as we use here typically provides (iii) For the likelihood contribution of wages we need to distinguish between observed wages and (latent) accepted wages. The accepted wages are assumed to be drawn from the wage offer distribution f(w) (assumed to be log-normal), while the observed wages are the accepted wages measured augmented with a log-normal measurement error. In the sequel, we denote observed wages with a superscript o. Moreover, for employed individuals we observe a wage during the current spell of employment and we may observe a new wage after a transition into a new job. We will denote current wages by subscript 1 and wages after a transition (irrespective of the initial state) by subscript 2. For unemployed individuals, the model implies that the distribution of the (latent) accepted wage is the offer distribution truncated to wages higher than the reservation wage 4: f (w2)/F () defined for w2 > ?, zero elsewhere. For the current (latent) wage w, of employed respondents the model implies that this wage must be higher than the reservation wage for the unemployed.
Consequently, the density is f(w)/fF((), wl > 4, zero elsewhere.26 At this point it is important to realize that for the employed the latent search intensity 3e also depends on the current wage wl. If someone employed transits into a new job, the model implies that the new wage w2 must be higher than the old wage wl.
25. Note that the conditioning on wages and unobserved heterogeneity runs through S1 . To keep notation simple, we do not express wages and unobserved heterogeneity explicitly in the notation. 26. Again, note that the distribution of accepted wages w2 of the unemployed and current wages w, of the employed depend on unobserved heterogeneity q, which we suppress in the notation. Thus, we have the density f(w2)IF (1), w2 > w1, zero elsewhere. Without measurement error in wages, the support of current wages wl for the employed and accepted wages w2 for the unemployed would depend on the model parameters through ? and standard conditions for applying maximum likelihood would not be satisfied. Moreover, for the employed, without measurement error a zero likelihood contribution arises if a wage w2 observed after a transition is lower than the wage wl before. If measurement error is included, the appearance of such an observation can be attributed to measurement or reporting error. We define the relation between observed and accepted wages by 
We could have explicitly denoted this in the notation by writing S S (S u)
To evaluate the likelihood contribution, we need to calculate four and five dimensional integrals of normally distributed random variables. This problem can be handled by using the smooth recursive conditioning algorithm (SRC) for simulating multidimensional integrals over normally distributed random variables and applying simulated maximum likelihood (SML) as described in Bijrsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993). The Monte Carlo integration involves the generating of random numbers for unobserved heterogeneity, latent current wages for the employed (generated such that they are higher than the reservation wage), and values for the latent vector of search indicators 1. 28 To allow for the fact that the available data on duration is a stock sample, we condition on backward recurrence times (conform Lancaster 1979; Ridder 1984). The derivation of the joint density of duration and search intensity, conditional on backward recurrence times is given in appendix 2.
V. Estimation Results
In this section we present the estimation results.
A. Parameter Estimates
The estimation results of the structural model are reported in the Tables 5 through 8. The rate of time preference p has been fixed, such that on a yearly basis the discount rate is 5 percent. In the simulated maximum likelihood procedure we use 60 replications from the error distribution of the search indicators, wages, and unobserved heterogeneity to simulate the integrals in Equations 20 and 21. Table 5 contains the parameter estimates of the job offer arrival rates and the layoff rate. For the unemployed, the exogenous part of the job offer arrival rate, k,u, is decreasing with age for the unemployed who are older than 25. Recall from Table 3 that the mean age for the subsample of the unemployed who are not searching is higher than the mean age of the subsample of unemployed who are searching. A lower value of ,u for unemployed individuals with a higher age implies lower returns to search (everything else being equal) for older unemployed, and therefore decreases the incentives to search. Unemployed individuals that only followed a general type of education (sec 3) have the lowest arrival rate. For the employed individuals Xe is decreasing in age. As for the unemployed, employed individuals without skill-specific education (sec 3) have the lowest value of the arrival rate ke. Moreover, in the West, more industrialized region of the Netherlands, employed individuals have higher arrival rates. The lay-off rate decreases with age until the age of 30, after which it increases. Individuals in the service sector have the highest lay-off rate, and individuals with the lower levels of education tend to have the higher layoff rates.
The lower part of Table 5 contains the coefficient estimates of the various search indicators of the job offer arrival rate. For both the unemployed and the employed the number of applications has the largest impact on the arrival rate, compared to the other search indicators. Moreover, the effect of the number of applications is significant for both labour market states. For the unemployed, the search attitude ("searching seriously") is also significant. The "screening" indicator does not have a significant coefficient estimate. This indicates that, for instance, "screening" alone, without taking any further action, does not significantly affect the job offer probability. For the employed, we do find a significant effect of "screening" on the arrival rate. Table 6 shows the parameters of the cost of search function. Recall that a parameter y,j has a negative impact on the marginal cost of search and consequently a positive impact on the optimal search intensity. We find that the unemployed with a larger family search harder, which is plausible. The parameter estimate of ,,j, j = 1,..., 3, is significant for all of the three search indicators. This parameter measures the impact of returns to search on the optimal search intensity. Apparently the returns to search are important in determining the optimal search intensity. For the employed marital status has a significant positive impact on the cost of search. The cost of search decreases with age until the age of 29 after which the cost of search increase. For the employed, we see that returns to search significantly affect the optimal search intensity for the various search channels (parameter yo,j). Table 7 contains the estimates of the covariance matrix of reporting errors of the search indicators. The estimates of the covariances between the various search channels are all positive and significant. Note that the estimated covariance matrices are positive definite. Finally, Table 8 shows the parameter estimates of the wage offer distribution. The mean wage offer rises with age until the age of 53, after which it falls. Wage offers are higher the higher is the level of education. Individuals without skillspecific training obtain higher wage offers, all things equal. Note that the standard deviation of the wage offer distribution is slightly larger than the standard deviation of the distribution of measurement error in wages. The numbers suggest that about half of the variation in observed wages is due to variation in wage offers while the other half is due to measurement error.
B. Elasticities
Up till now we have only looked at the separate coefficient estimates. In order to gain more insight into the implications of the model we computed several elasticities. Analytic expressions for the elasticities are presented in Appendix 2. The elasticities have been evaluated at the mean values of the observed characteristics of the unemployed and the employed (see Table 3 ). 29 The computed values of various elasticities are shown in Table 9 .30 For the unemployed we computed the impact of the benefit level on the reservation wage. This quantifies the impact of the benefit level on the Table 9 Elasticities ( decision to accept or to reject a job. The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the benefit level is 0.028 and it is significantly different from zero. For the unemployed it is interesting to consider the effect of an increase in the benefit level on search. We present the elasticity for the number of applications, since this is the search indicator that can be directly observed, and therefore it is the easiest to interpret. The computation of the elasticity is based on Equation 30 in Appendix 2. We evaluate the elasticity at the (simulated) mean level of the Poisson distribution. The elasticity of the (mean) number of applications with respect to the benefit level is -0.0021. It is significantly different from zero, although the size of the elasticity is small.
We can also compute the elasticity of the probability that it is optimal to apply for a job (P (Su3 > 0)) with respect to the benefit level. This elasticity takes the value of -0.00010 for someone with the mean characteristics of the unemployed. Again, the estimate of the elasticity is significant, but its size is small. Together with the results for the previous two elasticities we may conclude that the impact of the benefit level on the acceptance decision is higher than on the decision to search.
To quantify the effectiveness of the number of applications on the hazard, we compute the elasticity of the hazard with respect to the (mean) number of applications, leaving the job acceptance probability constant. Note that this shows a partial effect only. The intensity of search and the reservation wage are simultaneously determined, and therefore a change in the mean number of applications and the acceptance probability will always go together. The value of the elasticity, however, provides insight into the effectiveness of search. We find that a 10 percent increase in the number of applications leads to an increase of 3.4 percent in the hazard. Note that this is a ceteris paribus effect, for a given value of X,: for a low value of Xu the eventual (absolute) effect of an increase in the number of applications will be much lower than for someone with a higher value of ,u.
The total elasticity of the hazard with respect to the benefit level is -0.22, which indicates that the impact of the benefit level on the hazard is not negligible.
To further quantify the discouraged worker effect we also computed the elasticity of the optimal number of applications with respect to the exogenous part of the arrival rate Xh. This elasticity takes the value 0.12 at the mean characteristics of the unemployed. This shows that the more effective way to stimulate individuals to search is to improve their labour marker opportunities,31 rather than to decrease the level of benefits. For employed individuals we computed the elasticity of the number of applications with respect to the wage. We find a value of -1.5 which suggests quite a sizeable impact of the wage on the number of applications. However, the value of the elasticity is not significantly different from zero. A possible explanation may be found in Table 4 which contains information on the wages of the employed, both before and after a job-to-job transition.
For the group of employed people that report to be searching, the distribution of wage income after a transition looks quite similar to the wage distribution before a transition of the employed who do not search. Thus, a transition of the employed who are searching is enough to make them similar to those who do not search and therefore the wage may show a sizeable negative impact on search. Since the majority of the employed does not search, variation in wages within the subsample of the employed who do not search does not add to the explanation of the number of applications, which may explain the inprecision of the estimate of the elasticity.
To quantify the effectiveness of the number of applications, we computed the elasticity of the job-to-job transition intensity, leaving the reservation wage constant. The elasticity takes the value 0.025 and this estimate is significantly different from zero. Thus, the number of applications of the employed has a smaller impact on a transition than for the unemployed.
C. Residual Analysis
In the structural modeling of duration data, usually a lot of structure is imposed on the data, both by the application of economic theory and by the choice of functional forms. The strength of a structural model is that it enables us to disentangle items like the cost of search, the returns to search, the arrival rate, the discouraged worker effect and the acceptance decision. All this makes a structural model a good point of departure for evaluating policy measures. However, because of the structure imposed, the fit of the duration data in structural models usually leaves much to be desired. Distribution of Residuals viduals that do not search can be quite long: a stationary exponential distribution, like we use in the modeling, apparently cannot fit these low turnover rates and high survivor probabilities at higher levels of duration. Note that the sample we use is largely a stock sample. In the estimation we allowed for that by conditioning on backward recurrence times. Another way to look at residuals is to split up duration in forward recurrence times and backward recurrence time.
Since we conditioned on backward recurrence times, we actually have explained the forward recurrence times, given survival up to a period which is as long as the backward recurrence time. Under the null hypothesis that the model is specified correctly, the residuals based on forward recurrence times and on backward recurrence times each follow an exponential distribution with Parameter 1. 
VI. Conclusions
We have specified an empirical version of the search model of Mortensen (1986) , in which the intensity of search is a choice variable for the individual. A higher level of search intensity increases the job offer arrival rate, but at the same time the cost of search rises. The individual chooses the intensity of search on the basis of a comparison of marginal returns of search with marginal cost of search. If the marginal returns to search are too high compared to the marginal cost of search, the individual will decide not to search. We extended the Mortensen (1986) framework to allow for differences in arrival rates and differences in the cost of search between the state of employment and the state of unemployment.
We use data on male individuals from the Dutch Socio Economic Panel (Statistics Netherlands). The dataset contains two dichotomous indicators for the intensity of search (search attitude, "screening" or not) as well as information on the number of applications. In the empirical specification the observed indicators of search are linked to the optimal search intensity derived from the economic model. In the empirical model we impose the structure of the economic model: The reservation wage for the unemployed is computed from the reservation wage equation, the equations for the various search indicators are based on the marginal cost equals marginal returns of search condition and transition intensities for transitions from unemployment to employment and for job to job transitions are specified as the product of the job offer arrival rate and the job acceptance probability.
The stochastic specification allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the cost of search, reporting errors in the search indicators and measurement error in wages. To deal with the integration over the latent variables and to allow for correlation in the stochastic structure of the different search indicators we employ the method of simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the model parameters. We use information on unemployment duration, employment duration, search indicators and wages to simultaneously estimate the job offer arrival rates, the layoff rate, the parameters of the cost of search function and the wage offer distribution.
For the unemployed we find that the job offer arrival rate decreases with age. This turns out to be an important result for the interpretation of the difference between unemployed individuals who report to be searching for a job and unemployed individuals who do not search: The mean age of those who do not search is considerably higher than the mean age of the unemployed who are searching. The unemployed with general (no specialized) education also have lower job offer arrival rates. The number of applications of the unemployed affects the arrival rate significantly, as does the search attitude. "Screening" is not found to have a significant effect on the arrival rate. For the unemployed we find that the cost of search decreases with family size and age (for age over 28). Furthermore, the returns of search are important in the determination of optimal search intensity.
Also for the employed we find that arrival rates decrease with age (for a given level of search intensity), and individuals without skill-specific training have lower arrival rates. The arrival rate also shows a regional effect: individuals living in the industrialized western part of the Netherlands have higher arrival rates. The layoff rate first decreases with age, but rises with age for individuals who are older than 30. Individuals with the lower levels of education have the highest layoff rates. The number of applications is the most effective search indicator for the employed, and screening also shows a significant effect on the arrival rate. Marital status has a positive effect on the cost of search for the employed. The cost of search decreases with age until the age of 29, after which it increases. We computed various elasticities to quantify the implications of the model. We evaluated elasticities at the mean characteristics of the employed and the unemployed. We also computed standard errors which show that most estimates of the elasticities are significantly different from zero. For the unemployed, the estimates of the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the benefit level and the elasticity of the hazard with respect to the benefit level are 0.028 and -0.22 respectively, which suggests a measureable effect of the benefit level on the job acceptance decision and on mean unemployment duration. The estimates of the elasticities of the number of applications and the probability of search with the respect to the benefit level are -0.0012 and -0.00010 respectively. The estimates are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, but they also show that the impact of benefits on search is small. The elasticity of the number of applications with respect to the exogenous part of the arrival rate (that represents job opportunities, or effectiveness of search) is much higher, namely 0.12. These findings together with the estimated decrease of the arrival rate for the older unemployed and the much higher average age for the subsample of the unemployed who do not search, suggest that a "discouraged worker effect" may be behind the decision not to search. The elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to the number of applications is 0.34 for the unemployed and 0.025 for the employed which suggests that, given everything else, it is more effective to search while being unemployed. For the employed we find an elasticity of the number of applications with respect to the current wage of -1.5. This suggests a sizeable impact of the wage, but this value is not significantly different from zero, as shown by its standard error.
We also studied the generalized residuals of the model in order to gain insight into the fit of the model and, in particular, to test for neglected duration dependence. For the unemployed the residual analysis shows that there is probably neglected duration dependence. A plot of the residuals based on forward recurrence times looks reasonably good, which suggests that the model manages to track transitions. For the employed, the misspecification of the model is clear. The exponential model without duration dependence cannot explain the low turnover rates at high durations observed in the data. However, it emerges that the inclusion of search intensity in the model improves on the model specification: not distinguishing individuals who are search-ing from those who do not search would have led to an inferior fit. In spite of this, the inclusion of search intensity alone is not enough to explain the high survivor rates of the individuals who do not search.
An additional complication in the computation of the generalized residuals in the present paper is that the density of duration contains a latent endogenous variable. We computed the hazard rate of the model by dividing the marginal density of duration by the marginal survivor function of duration. The marginal density function of duration is obtained by integrating Equation 20 for the unemployed and Equation 21 for the employed over wages and search intensity.
The generalized residuals are computed by determining the integrated hazard (evaluated in the observed duration, or in the forward or backward recurrence time, see Section V) on the basis of this hazard.
